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Congressional Discretion Under the
Property Clause
By

EUGENE

R.

GAETKE*

The property clause of article IV' grants Congress the authority to
regulate federal lands.2 In referring to that authority, the Supreme
Court has observed that "the power over the public land thus entrusted
'3
to Congress is without limitations."
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A., 1971; J.D., 1974, University of Minnesota.
1. Article IV, section three, clause two of the United States Constitution empowers
Congress to: "[D]ispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .... "
2. Congress is given further authority over certain federal property under article I,
which provides that Congress shall have the power: "To exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of
the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of
the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Id.
I..."art. I, § 8, cl. 17. In addition
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings .
to providing Congress with the authority to govern the District of Columbia, this provision
authorizes Congress to legislate exclusively for a special category of federal property, generally known as "federal enclaves." Engdahl, Stateand FederalPowerOver FederalProperty,
18 ARIZ. L. REv. 283, 288-90 & n.17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Engdahl]. For federal
property outside the District of Columbia to qualify as article I property, it must meet two
criteria. First, the legislature of the state in which the property is located must consent to the
United States' acquisition of legislative authority over the property. See Paul v. United
States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875). Second, the
land must be purchased for the erection of "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and
other needful Buildings." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Over such federal enclaves, Congress possesses exclusive governmental jurisdiction under article I. Engdahl, supra, at 28890. The only limits on congressional discretion under article I, therefore, appear to be those
imposed by other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Bill of Rights. See PUBLIC
LAND LAW REviEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 278 (1970). See

notes 9-10 & accompanying text infra. All federal property that is not article I property is,
by definition, article IV property.
3. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S 529, 539 (1976). While language in Supreme
Court cases thus supports the broadest possible interpretation of the property clause power,
other language from the Court supports the narrowest possible interpretation--that the powers of Congress over the federal lands are "only the rights of an ordinary proprietor." Fort
Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 527 (1885). Scholarly analysis similarly has led to
sharply divergent views about the extent of the article IV power over federal property.
Broad views of the power are found in Coggins & Hensley, ConstitutionalLimits on Federal
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The simplicity of the Court's statement is appealing. Its implica-

tions, however, are troubling, 4 especially for those states in which a
substantial amount of federal property exists. 5 If the property clause
power of Congress is "without limitations," the power of some states
over a considerable portion of the land within their boundaries is severely limited. 6 For those states, an unlimited property clause power in

Congress significantly shifts the balance of powers struck by the federal
system. 7 The concerns engendered by a property clause power "without limitations" are further heightened because the power has been

used by Congress to regulate conduct on nonfederal property as well as
on federal property. 8 Such legislation extends the reach of federal regulation solely on the congressional determination that the legislation is

a "needful" rule "respecting" federal property.
No congressional power is limitless. At a minimum, each power is
limited by the individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights. 9 The
Court's assertion that the property clause power is "without limitaPower to Protect andManage Wildlife: Is the EndangeredSpecies Act Endangered?,61 IOWA
L. REV. 1099, 1135-39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Coggins & Hensley]; Sax, Helpless Giants:
The NationalParks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 250-55
(1976). Narrow views of the power are presented in Engdahl, supra note 2, at 296-300;
Engdahl, Some Observationson State andFederalControl ofNaturalResources, 15 Hous. L.
REV. 1201, 1208-11 (1978); Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing
Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 821-25 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Property Power].
4. While asserting that the property clause power is "without limitations," the
Supreme Court also noted that the "furthest reaches" of that power "have not yet been
definitively resolved." Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976). This statement
implies that the power has limitations not yet ascertained. The property clause power is
certainly limited by the Bill of Rights. See notes 9-10 & accompanying text infra.
5. In twelve western states, at least 29% of the land is federally owned. Property
Power, supra note 3 at 817-19. Furthermore, the implications of a property clause power
"without limitations" are serious even for those states containing little federal property
within their boundaries. See note 73 infra.
6. This result follows from the Court's further assertion, in Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529 (1976), that property clause legislation has preemptive effect under the
supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. The Court noted: "Absent consent or cession a
State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress
equally surely retains power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause." 426 U.S. at 54. Thus, to the extent
Congress validly exercises its property clause power, contrary state law must yield. The
Court's conclusion that property clause legislation may thus preempt state law has been
subject to scholarly criticism. See Engdahl, supra note 2. at 354-55.
7. The limitation on the powers of the western states resulting from such federal regulation has led to efforts by those states to seek a reduction of the amount of federal lands.
PropertyPower, supra note 3, at 819 n.24.
8. See text accompanying notes 17-19, 26-27 & 41-53 infra.
9. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969)
(commerce clause power may not be exercised to violate the fifth amendment privilege
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tions" could not have been intended to signify an exemption of the
exercise of that power from the restraints imposed upon government
elsewhere in the Constitution. 10 Instead, the Court referred to the
against self-incrimination); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (commerce clause
power may not be exercised to violate the sixth amendment right to jury trial).
Among such extrinsic constitutional limitations on all uses of the property clause, the
"taking" clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, becomes crucial when the
property clause power is used to regulate conduct on nonfederal property. To the extent
such property clause regulation is deemed a "taking" of private property, 'Just compensation" to the property owner would be required. In Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S.
668 (1979), for example, the United States claimed an easement across private land to certain federal lands. .d. at 678-80. The government argued that such an easement arose by
operation of the Unlawful Inclosures Act of 1885, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1976), discussed
in text accompanying notes 44-48 infra, which prohibited the obstruction of access to the
public lands. Id. § 1063. Although the Supreme Court rejected the government's construction of the statute, it noted that such an exercise of the federal government's powers over
federal lands would require compensation to the private property owner. 440 U.S. at 685,
687-88.
Even the use of the property clause power for regulating conduct on the federal lands to
effectuate a policy for the use of those lands might violate the "taking" portion of the fifth
amendment. If Congress passed a law, for example, to use a tract of federal lands as a
hazardous waste disposal site, the effect of that legislation might be so detrimental to the
neighboring nonfederal lands that it would constitute a "taking" requiring compensation
under the fifth amendment.
For a discussion of the limits imposed on the exercise of governmental power by the
"taking" portion of the fifth amendment, see Micheman, Property, Utiliy, and'Fairness:
Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof 'ust Compensation"Law, 80 HARv. L. Rev. 1165
(1967); Sax, Takings,PrivatePrapert andPublicRights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
The reach of the property clause power to conduct occurring outside of the federal
lands also raises serious questions of the proper balance of powers in our federal system.
See Sax, Helpless Giants: The NationalParksand the RegulationofPrivateLands, 75 MICH.
L. REv. 239, 254-55 (1976). To the extent that such an exercise of the property clause power
interferes with powers reserved to the states, the tenth amendment provides a potential limitation. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (tenth amendment
prohibits congressional regulation of interstate commerce that impermissibly interferes with
the states' conduct of their integral governmental functions). While no Supreme Court case
addresses the subject. one student commentator has proposed that the tenth amendment be
viewed as such a limitation on the property clause power. PropertyPower, supra note 3, at
828-33. The same commentator presents a novel argument that the equal footing doctrine,
generally used to prohibit the imposition of conditions on the admission of a new state to the
Union, provides an additional constitutional limit on the property clause power. Id. at 83338. This Article addresses only limitations on the property clause power imposed by the
terms of the clause itself, not by other constitutional provisions.
10. The Supreme Court decided Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), in which
it asserted that the property clause power is "without limitations," one week before its decision regarding the tenth amendment as a limit on the commerce clause power, National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Arguably, therefore, the Court's assertion of
a limitless property clause power in Klepfpe was unrelated to the possible tenth amendment
limitation revealed in NationalLeagueof Cities. This argument, however, does not address
the other recognized constitutional limits on all congressional powers. See note 9 supra.
Thus, the sequence of the Court's decisions in Kleppe andNationalLeagueof Cities does not
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scope of the property clause power itself.1 '
This Article examines the proposition that the property clause
power is "without limitations." It contends that, while the property
clause power may be unlimited when exercised to regulate conduct on
federal lands, the use of this power to regulate conduct on nonfederal
land cannot constitutionally be "without limitations." Finally, the Article suggests a balancing approach, based on a nuisance analogy, that
may be useful in determining the proper scope of the property clause
power over nonfederal property.

Types of Property Clause Enactments
The property clause power has been used by Congress in three
ways: to regulate the acquisition of interests in the federal lands,' 2 to
protect the federal lands, and to effectuate congressional policies regarding the use of the federal lands. In addition, each of these uses of
the property clause power has served to justify the regulation of conduct on nonfederal property.
Acquisition of Interests in Federal Property
The property clause gives Congress the power to "dispose of' the
federal lands and to make "needful rules and regulations respecting"
them.1 3 At a minimum, article IV grants Congress the powers of a proprietor over the federal lands. Like other proprietors, Congress may
4
decide whether, when, and on what terms to dispose of those lands.'
Certain governmental objectives, such as the rapid settlement of the
West and the construction of the transcontinental railroad, '5 have thus
been accomplished through the transfer of an interest in the federal
lands rather than through the exercise of a governmental regulatory
detract from the assertion that the Court was not addressing constitutional limits extrinsic to
the property clause when asserting in Keppe that the property clause power was "without
limitations."
11. The Court was asserting that congressional discretion on how to "dispose of' the
public lands or on what were "needful rules and regulations respecting" the federal lands is
"without limitations." The assertion, therefore, does not address other possible constitutional limitations on congressional action within the limits of the property clause power.
12. The property clause power granted Congress by article IV also applies to federallyowned personal property. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 137 n.80 (D.D.C.
1975). This Article, however, addresses only congressional property clause power over federal and nonfederal real property.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
14. The power to "dispose of' the federal lands includes the discretion to retain the
federal lands. See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911).
15. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669-77 (1979).
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power.16
As it is proprietary in nature, congressional power to dispose of the
federal lands would appear to have no application to nonfederal property. Congress has, however, used its dispositional power to further

policies on nonfederal property by inserting conditions in grants of federal property.
In United States v. City and County f San Francisco,17 Congress

conveyed federal lands to the city for water supply and for generating
electricity. The grant was conditioned, however, on the requirement

that all energy produced at the site be sold by the city to consumers
rather than to private utility companies. Noting that "Congress may
constitutionally limit the disposition of the public domain to a manner
consistent with its views of public policy,' 8 the Supreme Court sustained the condition under the property clause even though the condition affected nonfederal property. 19

The Court's conclusion is not surprising. Congressional discretion
over whether or not to dispose of federal property necessarily encompasses the discretion over whether to condition transfers of interest in

the federal lands. Conditional grants of federal property designed to
16. Congress historically has also used its property clause power to prescribe procedures necessary for the acquisition of title to the federal lands. See Ross v. Doe ex rel.
Barland, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 655 (1828). Thus federal law determined the priority of settlers'
conflicting title claims to the federal lands even after a state's admission to the Union. See
Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958); United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19, 27-29, 35-36 (1947); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389,
404-05 (1917); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99-100 (1872); Irvine v. Marshall,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 558, 561-62 (1858); Jourdan v. Barrett, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 169 (1846);
Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839); Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436
(1839); Ross v. Doe ex rel. Barland, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 655 (1828). This principle extended to
acquisition of lesser interests in federal property as well. In United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 526 (1840), for example, the Supreme Court upheld the insertion of certain conditions in a federal license for smelting lead ore on the public lands. The conditions included
the requirement that the licensee provide a certain quantity of the smelted ore to the federal
government. Id. at 536. Once title passed from the United States to the first grantee under
federal law, however, subsequent transfers were governed by state law. Wilcox v. Jackson,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 517 (1839). Such a view of the property clause power was necessary to
ensure that congressional policy on the disposition of the federal lands was not frustrated by
the states and to prevent state law from confusing and complicating the steps necessary to
acquire title to the federal lands. See Engdahl, supra note 2, at 296-97.
17. 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
18. Id. at 30.
19. Id. at 29-30. Similarly, in Federal Power Comm'n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17
(1952), a federal license for the construction and operation of a hydroelectric plant on federal lands was conditioned on the licensee's permission to allow the United States to transmit on the licensee's powerlines power generated by certain federally-owned facilities. Id. at
19.
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effectuate policies on nonfederal lands, therefore, are merely an application of the proprietary power to dispose of the federal lands, despite
the effects of the power beyond the boundaries of those lands.
Protection of the Federal Lands

In addition to the proprietary powers granted Congress to dispose
of the federal lands, the property clause also grants Congress the power
to make "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting . . . property
belonging to the United States." 20 Congress has used this aspect of the

property clause power to protect the federal lands from harm by regulating conduct on both federal and nonfederal lands.
As proprietor of the federal lands, the federal government is enti-

tled to use the private rights of action available to protect private property from harm. 21 The property clause, however, also gives Congress
the legislative power to protect the federal lands from harmful conduct
occurring on them.2 2 Legislation enacted pursuant to this power will
supersede contrary state law.2 3 Thus, although a private proprietor is
24
not able to permit conduct that violates state law on his or her lands,
25
the property clause authorizes Congress to do S0 .
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2.
21. See Gaetke, The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of1978.- Regulating
Nonfederal Property Under the Property Clause, 60 ORE.L.REV. 157, 167 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Gaetke].
22. Id. Thus Congress, like any proprietor, may designate what conduct it prohibits on
its lands. See McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922); Light v. United States,
220 U.S. 523 (1911). Unlike other proprietors, however, Congress may enforce such legislation by criminal sanctions. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (grazing); United States v. Briggs, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 351 (1850) (logging).
23. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928) (federally authorized killing of deer
that were over-browsing a national forest upheld even though the killing violated state game
laws). For a discussion of Hunt, see Gaetke, supra note 21, at 167 n.55. This principle is
also evidenced in several grazing cases, id., and in cases involving questions of title to the
federal lands. State law governing such title questions was required to yield to federal law
until such time as title had passed from the United States to a grantee. See note 16 supra.
24. A private property owner might forbid hunting on his or her property although
state laws permit it. See Smith v. Odell, 194 App. Div. 763, 185 N.Y.S. 647, 648 (1921). The
private owner, however, may not permit hunting when state laws forbid it, which was the
action taken by the federal government and approved by the Supreme Court in Hunt v.
United States, 278 U.S. 96, 98 (1928). See Engdahl, supra note 2, at 317.
25. The rationale of Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928), discussed innote 23
supra, was extended in New Mexico State Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 961 (1969). In Udall, the killing of deer for mere research purposes within a national park in violation of state game laws was upheld. The research was
intended to enable the establishment of a management plan to preserve the scenery and
wildlife of the park. The killing thus was related to the protection of the federal lands,
although its relation was not as direct as in Hunt itself.
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Harm to the federal lands may also result from conduct occurring
outside their boundaries. In this situation, the federal government may
resort to private rights of action to remedy such harm.26 Furthermore,
of the harmCongress' property clause power permits direct regulation
27
ful conduct, even though it occurs on nonfederal lands.
Promoting Policy on the Use of Federal Lands
In addition to disposing of the federal lands28 and legislating for

their protection, 29 Congress has employed its -property clause power to
promote its policy regarding the use of federal lands. The property
clause empowers Congress, the proprietor of the federal lands, to determine the policy for the use of these lands. This power has been used,
for example, to designate certain federal lands as national forests, 30 national parks, 3 ' wilderness areas,32 and wildlife refuges. 33 To promote
its land use policy, Congress may regulate conduct occurring on federal
lands, even if that conduct does not threaten those lands with harm.
The Supreme Court upheld Congress' power to determine and effectuate its policy for the use of federal lands in Kleppe v. New Mex26. See Gaetke, supra note 21, at 168.
27. See United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927) (statute prohibiting the careless
building of fires near federal lands upheld despite the statute's reach to nonfederal property). For a discussion of A/ford, see Gaetke, supra note 21, at 168-69 & nn.57-61.
More recently, in United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979), federal regulations regarding campfires and camping were held applicable to state-owned riverbeds within
a national forest. Similarly, in United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 821-23 (8th Cir.), cert
denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977), federal regulations prohibiting hunting and the possession of
loaded firearms within a national park were held applicable to nonfederal public waters
within a national park. Thus, the A/ford application of the property clause reaches all
nonfederal property, public as well as private.
The property clause power also has been used by Congress to protect the federal lands
from other dangers. For example, in the Shipstead-Nolan Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 577-577b
(1976), Congress restricted logging within 400 feet of the shorelines of lakes and streams
within what is now the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness in northern Minnesota
and alteration of water levels of those lakes and streams that would result in the inundation
of the federal lands. While the logging restrictions merely regulate conduct on federal lands,
the restrictions on the alteration of water levels regulate conduct beyond the boundaries of
the federal lands because those waters are state, not federal, property. See Gaetke, supra
note 21, at 163 & n.37.
28. See notes 13-19 & accompanying text supra.
29. See notes 20-27 & accompanying text supra.
30. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103 (repealed 1976).
31. See, e.g., Yellowstone National Park Establishment Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
32. Wilderness Act of 1964 §§ 2-7, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976).
33. National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966 §§ 4, 5, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 668dd, 668ee (1976).
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ico, 34 In Kleppe, the Court reviewed property clause legislation
protecting wild horses and burros. 35 The Court sustained Congress' determination that the legislation was "needful" regulation "respecting"
the federal lands without relying on the possible grounds that the animals were federal property 36 or that the legislation was an effort to protect federal lands from harm. 37 The Court recognized that Congress
38
intended to designate the federal lands as a sanctuary for the animals
to preserve an important symbol of "the historic and pioneer spirit of
the West."' 39 The state's traditional power to regulate wildlife was re40
quired to yield to the federal property clause legislation.

Congress also has used the property clause power to promote its
policies for the use of federal lands by regulating conduct on
nonfederal lands. 41 Thus, Congress has used its property clause power

to prohibit otherwise lawful conduct on nonfederal property, although
the conduct posed no threat to the federal lands. In 1897, in Camfield v.
United States,4 2 a private landowner devised a fencing scheme that en34. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
35. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act §§ 1-10, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1976). The Act protects those wild horses and burros on the federal lands from "capture,
branding, harassment, or death." Id. § 1331. The Act also purports to protect such animals
that have strayed onto nonfederal property. Id. § 1334. The question of the constitutionality of that aspect of the legislation was expressly reserved by the Court for future consideration in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 546-47. For further discussion of this aspect of
the legislation, see notes 97-108 & accompanying text infra.
36. Such an assertion, if sustained, would have brought the legislation within the established rule of A/ford, because Congress would then be protecting federal property from
harm. See text accompanying note 27 supra. No such assertion, however, was made in
Kleppe. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 537 n.8.
37. See 426 U.S. at 537 n.7.
38. Id. at 535.
39. Id. at 535-36 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976)).
40. The Court stated: "[Wihere those state laws conflict with . . . legislation passed
pursuant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede." Id. at 543.
See note 6 supra. The state agents had captured and removed 19 burros from federal land
under the New Mexico Estray Law, 426 U.S. at 532-34. The Court's conclusion in Kleppe
that property clause legislation has preemptive effect under the supremacy clause was relied
upon in Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), af'd mem., 445
U.S. 947 (1980), in which a local zoning ordinance was held to be inapplicable to the federal
government's lessee engaged in oil exploration and extraction on federal lands. As in
Kleppe, the regulation of conduct on the federal lands to effectuate the congressional policy
on their use preempted contrary state regulation. Id. at 1084. The Court had reached the
same conclusion, without referring to the supremacy clause, in Hunt v. United States, 278
U.S. 96 (1928), discussed in text accompanying notes 23-25 supra, on legislation intended to
protect the federal lands from harm.
41. This discussion is to be distinguished from Congress' use of its property clause
power of disposition to regulate conduct on nonfederal lands. See text accompanying notes
17-19 supra.
42. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
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closed huge amounts of federal land, although the fences were constructed only on private lands. 43 The United States brought suit to
compel the removal of the fences under the Unlawful Inclosures Act of
1885, 4" which prohibited such fencing schemes. The Court rejected the
defendant's constitutional claim that the regulation of fences built on
private property was outside the scope of the property clause. 45
The property clause enactment sustained in Camfield regulated

conduct on nonfederal property solely to promote Congress' federal
land use policy. Although it has been interpreted as protecting federal
lands from harm, 46 the statute upheld in Camfield was enacted to ensure public access to the federal lands for pasturage and settlement. 47
It thus encouraged unlimited public use of the federal lands, rather
48
than their protection from harm.
Congress also has regulated conduct on nonfederal property to
promote other federal land policies. 4 9 Congress has used the property
clause power to prohibit the harming of wild horses and burros on pri43. Id. at 519-20. For an historical discussion of the "checkerboard" land grant scheme
that led to the fact situation of Camfleld, see Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668,
669-77 (1979), and Gaetke, supra note 21, at 169 & n.64.
44. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1976). The statute was Congress' response to a large
number of such fencing schemes enclosing enormous tracts of western federal lands along
the transcontinental railroad. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 683-84
(1979).
45. The Court concluded: "The general Government doubtless has a power over its
own property analogous to the police power of the several States, and the extent to which it
may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case. If
it be found to be necessary for the protection of the public, or of intending settlers, to forbid
all enclosures of public lands, the Government may do so, though the alternate sections of
private lands are thereby rendered less available for pasturage." 167 U.S. at 525.
46. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 538 (1976); Engdahl,supra note 2,
at 306-08; PropertyPower, supra note 3, at 821.
47. Gaetke, supra note 21, at 170-71.
48. Gaetke, supra note 21, at 170-71. Although the Camfield holding that Congress
may use its property clause powers to regulate conduct on nonfederal property to promote
congressional policy for the use of the federal lands fully encompasses the holding in Aford
that the property clause power may be used to regulate conduct on nonfederal property for
the protection of the federal lands from harm, the two holdings are not coextensive. Id. at
170-71.
49. The Unlawful Inclosures Act of 1885, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1976), discussed in
note 44 supra, prohibited other conduct on nonfederal lands in addition to clever fencing
schemes. It provided that: "No person, by force, threats, intimidation, or by any fencing or
inclosing, or any other unlawful means, shall prevent or obstruct, or shall combine and
confederate with others to prevent or obstruct, any person from peaceably entering upon or
establishing a settlement or residence on any tract of public land subject to settlement or
entry under the public land laws of the United States, or shall prevent or obstruct free passage or transit over or through the public lands. . . ." Id. § 1063. Thus, threats made on
nonfederal lands against persons attempting to enter federal lands were made punishable.
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vate lands50 and the use of motors on state-owned lakes and streams
within wilderness areas. 51 While such use of the property clause power

historically has not been extensive, 52 its potential is enormous, particularly if the power is interpreted to be "without limitations.

'53

Limitations on the Property Clause Power
Despite the Supreme Court's assertion in Kieppe v. New Mexico
that the property clause power is "without limitations," there probably
The aspect of the statute was upheld in McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922).
The threats in McKelvey, however, occurred on federal lands. 1d. at 354-56.
Another statute seeking to effectuate the congressional policy of rapid settlement of the
federal lands prohibited the making of false representations regarding those lands. 18
U.S.C. § 1861 (1976). This statute was upheld in United States v. Fisher, 11 F.2d 629 (W.D.
La. 1926), apparently as an exercise of the dispositional power under the property clause.
1d. at 630. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra. The prohibition of false representations regarding the public lands might prevent potentially conflicting title claims to such
lands. The statute, however, furthered Congress' rapid settlement policy by promoting confidence in the potential settlers.
50. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976). In
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 34-40
supra, the Supreme Court upheld the statute's protection of animals on the federal lands.
The Court expressly reserved judgment, however, on the constitutionality of the statute's
reach beyond the federal lands. 426 U.S. at 546-47. For a discussion of the question thus
reserved in Kleppe, see text accompanying notes 97-106 infra.
51. Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, § 3, 92
Stat. 1649. For a discussion of the constitutionality of that statute's regulation of motorboats
on state-owned waters, see Gaetke, supra note 21. A challenge to the Act's regulation of
motorboats on property clause grounds was rejected in National Ass'n of Property Owners
v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Minn. 1980), appealdocketed sub noma.
Minnesota v.
Bergland, No. 80-1769 (8th Cir. Sept. 30, 1981). See note 96 infra. The Wilderness Act of
1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976), also regulates the use of motorboats on waters within
federal wilderness areas. Id. § 1133(c). To the extent those waters are state-owned, this Act
also regulates conduct on nonfederal property under the property clause. See also 36 C.F.R.
§§ 2.11, 2.32 (1979) (prohibiting hunting within the boundaries of a national park); United
States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977) (federal hunting
regulations applied to the state-owned waters within Voyageurs National Park in northern
Minnesota). For a discussion of the states' ownership of navigable waters and the lands
underlying those waters, even within the boundaries of federal lands, and for further discussion of Brown, see Gaetke, supra note 21, at 162-65, 178 & n.120.
52. This use of the property clause power has remained dormant because Congress
generally finds justification for its regulation of conduct on nonfederal lands elsewhere in
the Constitution. See, e.g., Sax, Helpless Giants. The NationalParks and the Regulation of
PrivateLands, 75 MICH. L. REv. 239, 255 (1976). Congress has, however, recently used the
property clause power to regulate conduct on nonfederal lands to effectuate its policies on
the use of federal lands. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
53. Whether the Afford and Camfield uses of the property clause power may be interpreted as being "without limitations" is discussed in the text accompanying notes 69-74
infra.

November 1981]

PROPERTY CLAUSE

54
are as yet unascertained limits within the property clause itself.

These potential limitations are best defined by reference to the three
different ways in which Congress has used the property clause:55 the
dispositional power, 56 the power to legislate for the protection of the
federal lands, 57 and the power to further congressional policy on the
58
use of federal lands.
Federal Lands
Applied within the boundaries of the federal lands, a property

clause power "without limitations" is understandable and defensible.
This unfettered power can be justified not only for proprietary dispositions of federal lands, but also for the power's use to regulate conduct
on such lands.
Decisions regarding whether, when, and on what terms to dispose
of federal lands are the same as decisions made by any proprietor. Article IV designates Congress as the "agent" authorized to make such

proprietary decisions regarding federal property on behalf of the federal government.5 9 To subject such measures to judicial review would

be to divest Congress of its role as agent. Judicial deference to the
judgment of Congress about the disposition of the federal lands is a
necessary consequence of the proprietary nature of such decisions. As
the Supreme Court is without guidance from the property clause for the
54. The Supreme Court implied this in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539
(1976). See note 4 supra.
55. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
56. See notes 13-19 & accompanying text supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 28-53 supra. In Kleppe, for example, the Supreme
Court was reviewing legislation that was an exercise of the property clause power to effectuate congressional policy on the use of federal lands by regulating conduct on those lands.
See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra. The Court's assertion in that case that the property clause power is "without limitations," however, was supported only by citations to cases
in which the property clause had been used to control the acquisition of interests in the
federal lands. 426 U.S. at 539.
59. That such decisions are regarded as being different in kind from others made by
Congress is illustrated by the Supreme Court's treatment of congressional delegations of the
dispositional power. Such delegations have been reviewed under a common law agency
approach rather than under the stricter requirements generally imposed by the doctrine of
separation of powers. See, eg., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474-75
(1914); Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1905). Legislation delegating
the dispositional power over the federal lands to the executive branch has been treated as
"not of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term." United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1914). Rather, such legislation "savors somewhat of mere rules
prescribed by an owner of property for its disposal." Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196
U.S. 119, 126 (1905).
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review of such proprietary matters, the dispositional power of Congress
over the federal lands thus may be interpreted as being "without
60
limitations."
The conclusion that congressional discretion under the dispositional power of the property clause is without limitations does not compel a conclusion that such judicial deference extends, or should extend,
to all uses of the property clause power.6 ' Nondispositional uses of the
power must be justified, under the express terms of the property clause,
62
as "needful Rules and Regulations respecting" federal lands.
Property clause regulation of conduct occurring only on the federal lands, however, falls easily within the express terms of the clause.
Whether intended to protect the federal lands from harm 63 or to effec-

tuate congressional policy regarding their use, 64 such regulation is
clearly "respecting" federal lands because its reach is confined to them.
The "needful" character of this type of regulation is unquestionable
when it is designed to protect federal lands from harm. 65 In addition,
the regulation of conduct appears to be the only device available to

Congress to effectuate its policy for the appropriate use of federal
lands. Thus, the regulation of conduct occurring on federal lands ap-

pears to be within the express limits of the property clause.6 6 When the
60. The only limitations, therefore, would be those limitations imposed elsewhere in
the Constitution. See note 9 & accompanying text supra.
61. In Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 519, 539 (1976), the Court cited only dispositional cases for the general proposition that congressional discretion under the property
clause is "without limitations." The Court thus incautiously leaped from the specific dispositional power to the general property power without expressly considering the differences in
the applicable constitutional language. See Engdahl, supra note 2, at 351-52.
62. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 536.
63. See notes 22-25 & accompanying text supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 30-40 supra.
65. Whatever power Congress may have over the federal lands, including its dispositional power, would be greatly diminished if Congress could not act to protect those lands
from destruction and impairment. Even advocates of a more restrained, proprietary view of
the property clause power recognize the necessity and existence of congressional authority to
legislate for the protection of the federal lands and to displace contrary state law in doing so.
See Engdahl, supra note 2, at 306-09.
66. See text accompanying note 62 supra. Moreover, the Court is unlikely to review
such property clause legislation. In Kleppe, for example, the Court noted: "The question
under the Property Clause is whether this determination can be sustained as a 'needful'
regulation 'respecting' the public lands. In answering this question, we must remain mindful
that, while courtsmust eventualy pass upon them, determinationsunder the Property Clauseare
entrustedprimarily to the judgment of Congress." 426 U.S. at 536 (emphasis added). Although the Court recognized that judicial review of such legislation exists, its decision
evinces no consideration of the "needful" and "respecting" aspects of the legislation under
review. The review in Kleppe was merely an assertion of the unlimited power of Congress
over federal lands, not an evaluation of the legislation under the express limits of the prop-
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property clause power to dispose of federal lands or to make needful
regulations respecting those lands is confined to the reaches of the federal property itself, therefore, the Supreme Court's characterization of
that power as being "without limitations" is justified.
Nonfederal Lands
While the exercise of the property clause power within the boundaries of the federal lands may be without limitations, judicial deference
should not necessarily extend to its exercise beyond those confines.
The disturbing specter of an unlimited property clause power not confined to the geographic limits of the federal lands warrants caution in
67
the further extension of that judicial deference.
The dispositional use of the property clause to promote congreserty clause. The review engaged in, and apparently envisioned by, the Supreme Court in
Kleppe for such property clause legislation, therefore, is perfunctory. A court following the
lead of the Supreme Court in Kleppe would be unlikely to probe a congressional decision to
regulate conduct on the federal lands to decide judicially whether the legislation was in fact
"needful" or "respecting" federal lands.
Besides apparently falling within the express limits of the property clause, such regulation frequently is no more than the exercise of the powers of any proprietor to control the
conduct occurring on his or her land. A proprietor of private property may act to prohibit
certain conduct on his or her land to protect it from harm or to further the owner's policy
regarding its use. Of course, state and local law may limit the private proprietor's decisional
power through zoning legislation and other regulatory hurdles. In passing such legislation,
Congress exceeds the powers of ordinary proprietors of land only when that legislation conflicts with state law. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 520 (1976); Hunt v. United
States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928). While a proprietor of private land may not override contrary
state law to protect his or her land or to accomplish some policy regarding its use, Congress
may do so under the property clause. See Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080
(9th Cir. 1979), af'dmem., 445 U.S. 947 (1980). See note 40 & accompanying text supra.
Even when the regulation exceeds such proprietary powers, however, judicial review
would be merely an evaluation of Congress' determination of the existence and extent of the
threatened harm to the federal lands or to Congress' policy for their use. In other constitutional contexts, the Court appropriately abstains from such factual second-guessing and is
also likely to do so in regard to the property clause. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971) (commerce clause authorizes regulation of intrastate loan sharking).
The Court looks only for some rational basis to support the congressional judgment. See J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 118, 158-59 (1977). The improbability of such judicial review and the obvious compliance with the express language of the
property clause supports a limitless congressional power to regulate conduct on the federal
lands.
To the extent that Congress so legislates, it also displaces state authority over matters
within the power of the states to regulate. Any limit on such disruption of the regulatory
role of the states, however, is provided by the tenth amendment, not the property clause.
Such congressional interference with state regulatory power does not detract from the nature
of such legislation as "needful" regulation "respecting" federal lands.
67. See text accompanying notes 69-73 infra.
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sional policy on nonfederal lands 68 is solely an exercise of congressional proprietary powers. Congress thus asserts no greater

governmental jurisdiction in making such conditional transfers than in
making unconditional transfers. Moreover, as such conditional trans-

fers are voluntary, they do not infringe upon the rights of owners of
nonfederal property except insofar as they consent to the infringement

by being transferees. As this use of the dispositional power is only proprietary, to limit such transfers would be to place Congress at a disadvantage relative to other proprietors. The use of the dispositional

power to promote congressional policy on nonfederal lands, therefore,
is appropriately regarded as being without limitations.
The nondispositional use of the property clause to regulate conduct on nonfederal lands to protect federal lands 69 or to promote congressional policy for their use, 70 however, raises two significant

concerns. First, such a nondispositional application of the property
clause power constitutes nonconsensual "governmental" regulation of
conduct beyond the boundaries of federal land. 71 Federal governmen-

tal regulation of conduct thus may be imposed upon nonfederal land
merely because of the proximity of that land to federal property] 2 The
rights of the owner of nonfederal property so located, 73 therefore, are
diminished as a result of such an exercise of the property clause power.

Second, the property clause regulation of conduct on nonfederal property encroaches upon the state's traditional regulatory role. The state's

power over the property within its boundaries thereby is diminished,
not only to the geographical extent of the federal lands found there, but
68. See notes 17-19 & accompanying text supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
70. See notes 41-53 & accompanying text supra.
71. This regulation should be distinguished from the voluntary "proprietary" regulation resulting from the exercise of the dispositional powers of Congress under the property
clause through conditional transfers of interests in federal lands. See notes 17-19, 68 &
accompanying text supra.
72. Such regulation of conduct on nonfederal property would not need to be justified
under one of the traditional, enumerated powers of Congress.
73. If the property clause power to regulate conduct on nonfederal property is "without
limitations," the proximity of that nonfederal property to the federal lands presumably will
be irrelevant. Although the greatest impact of such use of the property clause would likely
fall upon lands adjoining the federal lands, a property clause power "without limitations"
would not be so circumscribed. All nonfederal property could be subjected to the exercise of
the property clause power. The present discussion, therefore, is relevant even for those
states containing little federal land within their boundaries. Hypothetically, a state containing no federal lands could be subjected to such federal regulation if the conduct regulated
was for the purpose of protecting or effectuating congressional policy for the use of federal
lands wherever situated.
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also to the extent that Congress decides to regulate conduct beyond the
federal lands.
Concern for the rights of states and individual property owners
may discourage the courts from extending the deference shown Congress' exercise of its property clause power to nondispositional property
clause regulation of conduct on nonfederal lands. The "needfulness"
of such legislation may be questionable simply because of its direct regulatory effect on nonfederal lands. Similarly, when a property clause
enactment regulates conduct on nonfederal property, its nature as regulation "respecting the federal lands" is obscured. Thus, judicial review
of such property clause legislation is useful and necessary. 74 The connection between the conduct regulated on nonfederal property and the
protection or use of federal property may become so tenuous that it
requires a judicial conclusion that the legislation is neither "needful"
nor "respecting the federal lands."
A Suggested Theory
There is no explicit judicial guidance on when property clause regulation of conduct occurring outside federal lands ceases to be "needful" regulation "respecting the federal lands." In 1976, the Supreme
Court noted that "the furthest reaches of the power granted by the
property clause have not yet been definitively resolved."75 The
Supreme Court, however, suggested a possible approach to the problem
in Camfield v. United States,76 the first case in which the Court ap-

proved nondispositional property clause regulation of conduct occurring beyond the boundaries of federal lands. Concluding that Congress
could, under its property clause power, prohibit the construction of
fences on private lands to enclose federal lands, the Court reasoned:
Considering the obvious purposes of this structure, and the necessities of preventing the enclosure of public lands, we think thefence is
clearly a nuisance, and that it is within the constitutional power of
may
Congress to order its abatement, notwithstanding such 7action
7
involve an entry upon the lands of a private individual.

To justify its conclusion in Camfield, the Court interpreted the abatement legislation as intended only to abate a nuisance. 78 Thus, the law
74. This is to be contrasted with the pro forma judicial review provided in Kleppe, a
case limited by its facts to the regulation of conduct on the federal lands. For a discussion of
the judicial review provided there, see note 66 supra.
75. Kleppe v. New M6xico, 426 U.S. at 539.
76. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
77. 167 U.S. at 525 (emphasis added).

78. The Court stated: "in passing the act in question, Congress exercised its constitu-
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of nuisance provides a basis for a test to determine when property
clause regulation of conduct on nonfederal lands is not "needful" regu79
lation "respecting the federal lands."

Under Camfield, Congress may transform an otherwise lawful use
of nonfederal property into an enjoinable nuisance by legislating for a
particular use of the public lands. Thus, the Court in Camfield invoked
a nuisance theory as a justification for the prohibition of the fences
under the property clause. 80 Agricultural fences constructed solely on
private property in an agricultural area generally are not considered to
be a nuisance. 8' In Camfield, however, Congress' policy for the use of
tional right of protecting the public lands from nuisances erected upon adjoining property
"1..167 U.S. at 528.
The Court also perceived the property clause power of Congress as "analogous to the
police power of the several States," noting that "the extent to which [Congress] may go in the
exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case." 167 U.S. at 525.
The Camfield Court's assertion that the property clause power of Congress is "analogous to
the police power," however, must be read cautiously today in light of the broader modem
view of the police power, which exceeds the mere abatement of nuisance. See Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 40-46 (1964). At that time, the prevalent view on the
limits of the police power was tied to the notion of nuisance abatement. Thus, a police
power regulation abating a noxious use of property by a private landowner was valid against
a claim of "taking." See id. at 38-40 & 48-50. In 1897, however, police power enactments
beyond such nuisance abatement efforts were suspect. Id. That the Court apparently felt a
need to bring the prohibition of the fences in Camfield within a nuisance theory to justify the
legislation as analogous to the police power, is further evidenced by its discussion of a Massachusetts statute that had prohibited the construction of spite fences and had been upheld as
constitutional by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. 167 U.S. at 523-24.
79. Camfield has been cited as standing merely for the proposition that Congress may
legislate under the property clause to protect the federal lands from harm. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra. Such an interpretation of Camfield implies a narrow definition
of "nuisance." "Nuisance" thus would be limited to situations in which the use of
nonfederal property physically threatened the federal lands. A careful reading of Camfield,
however, supports a broader definition of the property clause power than that limited merely
to the protection of the federal lands from harm, see text accompanying notes 46-48 supra,
and a less rigid view of nuisance, see notes 81-84 & accompanying text infra. See also
Gaetke, supra note 21, at 170-73 & nn.68-80.
80. Such an interpretation of nuisance extends beyond the protection of the federal
lands from physical harm. See text accompanying notes 46-48, 79 supra.
81. The cases cited by the Court support the contention that a private landowner may
construct any sort of fence on his or her own land. 167 U.S. at 523. The Court's discussion
of the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, also provides little support for its conclusion that the fences in Camfield were a nuisance. Id. at 522-23. The Court stated: "[lilt has
been the settled law, both of this country and of England, that a man has no right to maintain a structure upon his own land, which, by reasons of disgusting smells, loud or unusual
noises, thick smoke, noxious vapors, the jarring of machinery or the unwarrantable collection of flies, renders the occupancy of adjoining property dangerous, intolerable or even
uncomfortable to its tenants. No person maintaining such a nuisance can shelter himself
behind the sanctity of private property." Id. Presumably, the fences in Camfield were typical of those used at that time and were not within the evils described by the Court.
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neighboring federal lands caused the fences to be deemed a nuisance.
Congress had determined that the federal lands were to remain open
and accessible to settlers for settlement and pasturage. 82 These fences
frustrated that congressional policy, 83 and, for that reason alone, were
84
regarded as a nuisance.

The law of private nuisance attempts to reconcile discordant uses
of land by property owners.85 Even a noxious use of property will be-

come a nuisance only when it substantially interferes with another
property owner's use of his or her property.8 6 The reference to nui-

sance in Camfield suggests a similar process of judicial balancing to
resolve the conflict between Congress' policy on the use of federal lands
and the use of nonfederal lands.8 7 The Court's use of such a balancing
82. Id. at 524-25, 527.
83. Id. at 525, 528.
84. Id. at 525. The Court expressly noted that identical fences built only to enclose the
private tracts within the "checkerboard" pattern, see note 43 supra, would not be regarded as
a nuisance, even though their effect would be to preclude, as completely as the actual fences
in Camfleld, access to the federal tracts. 167 U.S. at 527-28.
85. Thus, it is not unusual under the Camfield approach based on nuisance theory that
the congressional policy on the use of the federal lands renders some conflicting use of
nonfederal property a nuisance. Moreover, it is not unusual under this nuisance approach
that the use of one's property can render an otherwise lawful use of another's property a
nuisance. What is unusual about the Camfield Court's use of nuisance theory is that Congress, by establishing its policy for the use of the federal lands, may regulate as a nuisance
conduct on nonfederal property that is not only lawful, but is also completely appropriate
where it occurs. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
86. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 596 (4th ed. 1971).
87. The balancing process used in Camfield is indicated by the Court's conclusion that
the fences were a constitutionally regulated nuisance specifically because of "the obvious
purpose of this structure, and the necessities of preventing the enclosure of the public lands
" 167 U.S. at 525.
.
The Court's balancing in Camfield is further illustrated by its hypothetical discussion of
the outcome had the fences been built to enclose only the private parcels within the "checkerboard" pattern. See note 84 supra. The Court's dicta indicated that such fences could not
constitutionally be prohibited under the property clause. The Court noted that "it is no
answer to say that, if such odd-numbered sections were separately fenced in, which the owner
would doubtless have the right to do, the result would be the same as in this case, to practically exclude the Government from the even-numbered sections. . . . So long as the individual proprietor confines his enclosure to his own land, the Government has no right to
complain, since he is entitled to the complete and exclusive enjoyment of it, regardless of any
detriment to his neighbor .... " 167 U.S. at 527-28 (emphasis added). For such fences,
therefore, the Court apparently recognized that the balance shifted in favor of the
nonfederal property owner's use of his or her land. The distinction drawn by the Court
between the actual and hypothetical fences in Camfield seems based, at least in part, on the
culpability of the private landowner's conduct. The actual fences in Camfieldwere intended
to frustrate the congressional open lands policy. The hypothetical fences, however, constructed only to enclose the private lands, would not be the product of such intent, although
their actual effect would be the same.
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process indicates both that the judicial deference accorded other congressional exercises of the property clause power 88 was not accorded
the legislation reviewed in Camfield and that there are limitations to the
property clause power of Congress when used to regulate conduct on
nonfederal lands.
Application of the Theory
The specific factors to be weighed in the balancing test suggested
by Camfield, however, are unclear. 89 The ultimate objective presumably is to weigh the utility of the congressional policy for the use of
federal lands and the effectiveness of the particular regulation in accomplishing that policy against the utility of the regulated conduct and
the likelihood of its interference with the congressional policy. Thus,
the value of the challenged regulation to the public lands should be
compared to' the degree of imposition on the owners of nonfederal
property. Should the balance indicate that the regulation interferes
with the ownership of nonfederal property more than is warranted by
Congress' stated policy, a court justifiably could conclude that it is not
a "needful" regulation "respecting the federal lands." 90 Thus, the regulation would not derive its authority from the property clause.
This balancing approach is easily applied to property clause regulation of conduct on nonfederal lands for the protection of federal
lands from harm because the utility of the policy is clear. In United
States v. Alford,9 1 the Court sustained an exercise of the property
clause power to prohibit the careless use of fire "near" federal lands.
The A/ford Court did not expressly use a balancing test, but the result
under such a test is obvious. The legislation at issue in A/ford was enacted to protect federal forests and grasslands from destruction by fire.
Its purpose was specifically to protect federal lands, which is a goal of
high utility. 92 Moreover, the prohibition of the careless use of fire on or
near federal lands93 is crucial for the prevention of the threatened
88.

See notes 59-62 supra.

89. For a discussion of the numerous factors used by the courts in private nuisance
actions to weigh the gravity of harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the defendant's
conduct, see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 596-600 (4th ed. 1971).

90. The Camfield balancing process would thus allow a court to prevent congressional
efforts to attain federal policy objectives merely by disguising legislation as property clause
enactments. See note 110 infra.

91.
92.

274 U.S. 264 (1927). For a discussion of A/ford, see note 27 supra.
See note 65 supra.

93.

Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 6, 36 Stat. 857 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1856

(1976)).
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harm. 94 In comparison, the -careless use of fire has no utility and is
directly contrary to the congressional policy of preserving the federal
lands from harm. The balance weighs heavily in favor of sustaining
the legislation in 4(ford as "needful" regulation "respecting the federal
95
lands."
Applying the test to legislation other than that designed to protect
federal lands from harm, however, is more difficult because the factors
defining 97the utility of the policy are more tenuous. 96 In Keppe v. New
Mexico, reviewing the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 98
the Court sustained the Act's regulation of conduct on federal lands, 99
but expressly reserved the question of the constitutionality of the Act's
reach beyond federal lands.1°°
The Act provides:
If wild free-roaming horses or burros stray from public lands onto
privately owned land, the owners of such land may inform the nearest federal marshall or agent of the Secretary, who shall arrange to
have the animals removed. In no event shall such wild free-roaming
horses1 oand burros be destroyed except by the agents of the Secretary. '
94. "The danger depends upon the nearness of the fire, not upon the ownership of the
land where it is built." United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. at 267.
95. The lack of any express balancing process in the Court's opinion in A/ford could be
explained by the obvious outcome of such a process under those facts. That obviousness
may also explain the brevity of the Court's discussion of the property clause issue in Alford,
which was presented in only two sentences. Id. at 267.
96. For an application of this approach to the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978), see Gaetke, supranote 21, at 17778. The balancing process set forth here, see text accompanying notes 89-90 supra, was
suggested but not discussed in the author's earlier work. Gaetke, supra note 21, at 183 n.131.
In that article, the author asserts that legislation regulating the use of motorboats on state
owned waters within a federal wilderness was within the holding of Camfield. The use of
motorboats was found to conflict directly with the congressional wilderness policy. Id. at
177-78. The nuisance approach suggested here, however, requires a balancing of the utility
of the federal wilderness policy and the effectiveness of the motorboat restrictions in accomplishing that policy against the utility of the use of motorboats in the area and the likelihood
of the interference of the motorboats with that wilderness policy. Thus, although motorboat
usage generally is a legitimate use of waterways, its enjoyment on every lake is not essential.
The vast availability of lakes for motorboat usage outside the wilderness area reduces the
utility of the regulated conduct within the wilderness area. Moreover, the use of motorboats
on the lakes within and partly within the area appears totally to frustrate the wilderness
policy of Congress. See Gaetke, supra note 21, at 177. Thus, under the balancing approach,
the regulation of motorboats should be sustained under the property clause. The Eighth
Circuit recently so held. Minnesota v. Bergland, No. 80-1769 (8th Cir., Sept. 30, 1981).
97. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). See notes 34-40 & accompanying text supra.
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976).
99. 426 U.S. at 540-41.
100. Id. at 547.
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976).

400
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This passage provides direct regulation of conduct on nonfederal property: on nonfederal property, persons may not destroy wild free-roaming horses or burros that have strayed from federal lands. 0 2 By this
legislation, Congress intended to protect the remaining wild horses and
burros. 0 3 To further that purpose, Congress designated the federal

lands as a sanctuary for the animals.' ° 4 Thus, under a balancing approach, the policy for the use of federal lands, providing a sanctuary
for the remaining wild horses and burros, must be coupled with the
effectiveness of the particular regulation. This policy is a commendable public objective for the use of the federal lands. 0 5 Moreover, the
extension of the protection of the animals beyond the boundaries of the
federal lands is a useful and rational method of furthering the congressional policy.
The utility of the policy and the regulation's ability to carry out the
policy must then be weighed against the utility of the regulated conduct
and the likelihood that the conduct will interfere with the policy.
The Act regulates the taking of wild horses and burros on
nonfederal property. Taking in accordance with state law and in a humane manner 10 6 may be useful, however, for it also may serve generally accepted goals, such as allowing the freedom to hunt and
protecting private lands from harm. Moreover, although taking wild
horses and burros on nonfederal lands may reduce the number of ani102. Other congressional powers may authorize this regulation. See Coggins & Hensley,
supra note 3, at 1122-43; Engdahl, supra note 2, at 350. The protection of wild horses and
burros on federal and nonfederal lands under the property clause, however, would be easily
sustained under the theories of Hunt and Afford if the animals were treated as federal property. See Coggins & Hensley, sufpra note 3, at 1137; Engdahl, supra note 2, at 350. No such
assertion was made by the federal government in Kleppe. 426 U.S. at 537 n.8. Thus, the
Court there affirmed the Act's property clause protection of the animals on the federal lands
solely as a way to effectuate the congressional policy on the use of those lands, not as a way
to protect federal property. See Engdahl, supra note 2, at 349-50.
103. The Act provides that: "It is the policy of Congress that wild free-roaming horses
and burros shall be protected from capture, branding, harrassment, or death; and to accomplish this they are to be considered in the area where presently found, as an integralpartof
the naturalsystem of the public lands." 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (emphasis added). See 16
U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1333 (1976).
105. This policy is commendable, but is not as compelling as the policy of protecting
federal lands from harm. Arguably, the policy of protecting federal property from harm
could justify the limits on the taking of the animals on nonfederal lands, if the animals are
considered federal property. Such an assertion, however, was not made in Kleppe. 426 U.S.
at 537 n.8. See note 102 supra.
106. The inhumane and otherwise illegal taking of such animals, however, is not useful.
The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act was largely a response to such senseless,
cruel slaughter of the animals. See American Horse Protection Ass'n v. United States Dep't
of Interior, 551 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Coggins & Hensley, supra note 3, at 1100-02.
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mals, this reduction may not interfere significantly with the congres-

sional policy of protecting the remaining wild horses and burros.
After weighing the competing interests, the court should consider
whether the regulation interferes with the ownership more than is warranted. As the animals freely pass between unfenced federal and

nonfederal lands, 07 taking wild horses and burros near the boundaries
of the federal lands may frustrate the policy of providing sanctuary.
The prohibition of such taking on all nonfederal lands, however, is unnecessarily broad, for it reaches conduct other than that which interferes with the congressional policy for the use of the federal lands.
Under a Camfield balancing process, therefore, the prohibition of the
killing of wild horses and burros on nonfederal lands may not be
"needful" regulation "respecting the federal lands" and thus may not
be authorized by the property clause.' 08
Predicting the precise application of the balancing test suggested
by Camfield is speculative. Like private nuisance law, the review of
legislation under such a test is a highly flexible process permitting the
judiciary considerable leeway in resolving the conflict between competing uses. In most situations, however, it would appear that the judicial
deference shown Congress regarding other uses of the property
clause 10 9 is likely to extend to judicial review of its use to regulate con-

duct on nonfederal lands. A judicial conclusion that such legislation is
107. Coggins & Hensley, supra note 3, at 1132 n.248. In their ability to move freely
across the boundaries of federal property, the animals resemble the fires prohibited by the
legislation reviewed in,1iford. See notes 91-95 & accompanying text supra. The free movement of the horses and burros creates substantial difficulty in determining which animals are
protected once they have strayed from federal lands. See American Horse Protection Ass'n
v. United States Dep't of Interior, 551 F.2d 432, 435-37 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
108. Rather than seeking to effectuate a policy for the use of the federal lands, the legislation appears to be intended to achieve a much broader objective: the protection of wild
horses and burros wherever found. While that objective is commendable, and while the
property clause may be exercised to assist in its achievement, the property clause power of
Congress does not justify such extensive regulation of conduct on nonfederal property.
The designation of the federal lands as sanctuary for the animals, as was done in the
legislation, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1333 (1976), is one way to further the objective of protection
of the animals through the use of the property clause power. The property clause might also
authorize the extension of that protection a reasonable distance beyond the boundaries of
the federal lands to insure that the free movement of the animals to nonfederal lands would
not permit the frustration of the sanctuary policy through the taking of animals at those
boundaries. Such a limited extension of the protection might be more easily justified under
the Camjfeld balancing approach than the assertion of property clause regulation of the taking of the animals wherever found. For a discussion of other constitutional bases for the
federal protection of wild horses and burros, see Coggins & Hensley, supra note 3, at 112243.
109. See notes 59-62 & accompanying text supra.
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not "needful" regulation "respecting the federal lands" presumably
will be quite unusual even under the Camfield balancing approach."I 0
Conclusion
The use by Congress of the property clause power to regulate conduct on nonfederal property, unrelated to a disposition of federal lands,
cannot be said to be "without limitations." In addition to limitations
imposed by other constitutional provisions, the property clause itself
appears to provide some restraints on its use outside the boundaries of
federal lands. Although the parameters of those restraints are unclear,
the balancing approach implicitly suggested by the Supreme Court in
Camfield presents a theory that might serve to bring them into better
focus.

110. Efforts to accomplish nationwide policy objectives should not escape judicial review solely because they are labelled as legislation pertaining to the federal lands. For example, Congress might choose to prohibit nationwide the sale of beverages in nonreturnable containers. Such legislation may be sustainable under the constitutional powers
of Congress, such as the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. A congressional
assertion that such regulation is necessary to alleviate litter on the federal lands, however,
should not insulate that legislation from probing judicial review under a mere assertion that
the property clause power is "without limitations." The nuisance analogy approach of Camfield would ensure that such regulation of conduct on nonfederal lands bears a sufficient
relationship to the federal lands to warrant its enactment under the property clause.

